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Abstract: 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the possibilities of industrialization and 
development in the 21
st
 century. With an ongoing global financial and economic crisis 
with only a tepid recovery at the time of this writing(August 2013) as well as the still 
unfolding ecological crisis, the 21
st
 century presents an even greater challenge for 
industrialization in the developing world than the post-WWII period. The changed 
global economic and ecological environment will shape the emergence of new 
technological and industrial paradigms and trajectories in significant ways (Dosi 2000, 
Khan 2004a). However, while the main thesis of this paper argues for a radical 
rethinking of development and industrialization within an ecological political economy 
framework in the 21
st
 century, there are still many relevant lessons---positive and 
negative--- from the post-WWII development and industrialization experiences and 
discourses. Therefore, the next section focuses on the development and industrialization 
experiences of the post-WWII period. This section also focuses in particular on the 
successful Asian economies in order to bring out a number of still relevant insights. 
Section 3 discusses the problems of industrialization and innovation in the particular 
21
st
 century context for China. The problems revealed through this case study can 
highlight many of the challenges of development, industrialization and innovation in 
the 21
st
 century. However, it must be pointed out that China is also a special case in 
many respects and poses some problems for itself and for the smaller developing 
countries by the strategy of development it has followed so far. The research strategy 
here is to both avoid the danger of falling into overgeneralization and to emphasize the 
need for a radical change in both the global economic environment and specific 
development and industrialization strategies. This is highlighted in section 4 of this 
paper where the outlines of  an alternative development strategy are given. 
 
Keywords: Industrialization strategies, development strategies. Innovation, heterodox 
policies, industrial policies, China 
 
JEL Classifications: O1, P1 
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1. Introduction 
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the possibilities of industrialization and 
development in the 21
st
 century. With an ongoing global financial and economic crisis 
with only a tepid recovery at the time of this writing(August 2013) as well as the still 
unfolding ecological crisis, the 21
st
 century presents an even greater challenge for 
industrialization in the developing world than the post-WWII period. The changed 
global economic and ecological environment will shape the emergence of new 
technological and industrial paradigms and trajectories in significant ways (Dosi 2000, 
Khan 2004a). However, while the main thesis of this paper argues for a radical 
rethinking of development and industrialization within an ecological political economy 
framework in the 21
st
 century, there are still many relevant lessons---positive and 
negative--- from the post-WWII development and industrialization experiences and 
discourses. Therefore, the next section focuses on the development and industrialization 
experiences of the post-WWII period. This section also focuses in particular on the 
successful Asian economies in order to bring out a number of still relevant insights. 
Section 3 discusses the problems of industrialization and innovation in the particular 
21
st
 century context for China. The problems revealed through this case study can 
highlight many of the challenges of development, industrialization and innovation in 
the 21
st
 century. However, it must be pointed out that China is also a special case in 
many respects and poses some problems for itself and for the smaller developing 
countries by the strategy of development it has followed so far. The research strategy 
here is to both avoid the danger of falling into overgeneralization and to emphasize the 
need for a radical change in both the global economic environment and specific 
development and industrialization strategies. This is highlighted in section 4 of this 
paper where the outlines of  an alternative development strategy are given. 
 
It should be noted at the outset that even during the post-WWII period , as some have 
pointed out (e.g.,Amsden(2008), , Jomo(2007,2001,1995), Khan (2004a,b; 1997), there 
were at least two sub-periods. The first was an era of relative optimism during the 
Bretton Woods period of managed global capitalism. During this era, there was an 
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overall strategy of development in the capitalist bloc that relied to a large extent on 
state-market synergy. It delivered fairly high growth for at least two decades in many 
countries but the distributional record was not impressive. Most importantly, the East 
Asian miracle with high growth and relatively benign distributional record throughout 
the entire post-WWII period(except the post-1990 record of China) also had its 
beginning during this era. Much of the infrastructural and human resources foundations 
for the subsequent growth and industrialization in the four tigers--- and in retrospect, 
for China and India--- were laid during these two decades. 
 
The second period---now that much of the smoke from the last thirty years has cleared--
- can be seen now as the demise of the Bretton Woods international financial 
architecture without any firm replacement except a dollar hegemony which now looks 
increasingly shaky. It is also seen as the era of Washington consensus which promised 
much but has delivered so far very little in the way of growth, investment and 
employment. Admittedly, both the periods were complex and a nuanced history is yet 
to be written; but the contrast is there. The rise of the Asian tigers including China and 
to some extent India has to be seen against this background. In this paper, the main 
argument regarding sustainable industrialization and development in this century is 
based on the idea of a complex economic system. The main conclusion is that while 
industrialization is both necessary and possible, a reasonable strategy must take into 
account the unevenness and complexity of the global economic system. Given that the 
developing countries themselves are at several different stages of development, there is 
no one-size-fits-all set of prescriptions. However, a nuanced and context-sensitive 
approach based on a realistic theory of development can still offer much help. 
 
Writing in 1926, in a biographical essay on Edgeworth, Keynes underlined some of the 
problems of complex human systems: 
 
We are faced at every turn with problems of organic unity, of discreteness, of 
discontinuity--- the whole is not equal to the sum of the parts, comparisons of quantity 
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fail us, small changes produce large effects, the assumptions of a uniform and 
homogeneous continuum are not satisfied.
1
 
 
If anything, the developing part of the world economy today shows to even a greater 
degree the kind of complexity captured in Keynes’s words above. Fortunately, systems 
theory and economic theory have both made some progress since those dark days. 
Although we are far from a genuinely complete theory of complex economic systems, 
efforts are underway that have already borne some interesting fruit in several limited 
areas.
2
 There are many facets of complex developing economies --each with its own 
sub-systemic characteristics to be sure, but there are also some common strategic 
features. The purpose of this paper  is to partly synthesize from a strategic perspective--
- to the extent it is possible to do so--- the development experiences of mainly the Asian 
economies with references to others( particularly the BRICs as a group and the Least 
Developed Coutries---the LDCs--- by way of contrast) and draw some appropriate 
lessons for industrialization and development in the 21
st
 century.. 
 
2. Defining Development and Stages of Development and Some Common 
Strategic Features 
 
However, at this point some clarification of the key term "development" is necessary in 
order to avoid ambiguities and confusions. In the rest of this paper, I will be referring to 
three concepts of development that are implicit in much of the  discussion in the field of 
industrialization and development. The first is the idea of development as growth with 
some structural change or at least the idea that this type of growth is the most crucial 
necessary condition for development. The second concept is derived by adding explicit 
distributional elements to growth--- particularly inequality and poverty. Both these 
ideas are shared by the development economists today ---at least implicitly. In a recent 
contribution,  Peter Warr is explicit in discussing all three---growth, absolute poverty 
and inequality
3
--- and his thoughtful essay alerts the reader to the performance of 
                     
1
 Keynes(1971-9), Vol. X, p. 261 
2
 See for example, Khan(2004a,b, 2003a,, 1998,1997) and the references therein. 
3
 At least since the McNamara period in the 70s, the World Bank took the lead in advocating 
“redistribution with growth”. ILO and UNCTAD also followed suit and had stronger lines of argument. 
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Thailand in all three areas and derives--- at least partly---  a logic of further necessary 
reforms following from his cogent analysis of the three aspects of development in this 
sense. .  He concludes: 
 
 
Not all aspects of the Thai development strategy have been similarly successful. 
Inequality has increased at the same time as absolute poverty has declined. The 
underlying causes of this increase in inequality are still not well understood. (Warr 
2008, p.22)
4
 
 
The third--- and the broadest approach to development discussed here--- is in terms of 
Sen's idea of capabilities and its further extensions. In this view, development is really 
an extension over time and space of freedom,particularly the positive freedom to lead a 
certain type of life an individual has reasons to value. In technical modeling of 
industrialization and development (including my own models---see appendixes) often 
this normative view is not adopted explicitly. Yet, in so far as there is a normative 
aspect about development being a "(public) good" that is a premise for the whole 
project of industrialization and development such a view is consistent with the 
modeling approaches as well. In a recent essay prepared for WIDER, Keun Lee's 
perceptive comments on the possible role of democracy in development extends 
considerably the terrain of discussion in the direction of the "development as freedom" 
perspective when he writes: 
We see obvious advantages in democracy, amongst which is the convenient feature that 
citizens are not subject to arbitrary arrest and torture. Truly strong states get it wrong 
more often than they get it right. Thus the military dictatorships of Latin America left 
little in the way of legacy ,whereas the military dictatorships in Korea and Taiwan 
(while not on anything like the same scale of brutality) left a powerful legacy of 
development. The difference lies clearly in strategic orientation and in institutional 
capacity in formulating and implementing a program of national industrial 
development. Our point is that this is an option available to the political leadership of 
any developing country today. On top of this, the key to the Korean or Asian success 
was institutional longevity. (Lee 2008, p. 13) 
  
                                                            
Sen did his earlier work on poverty in the 70s  under ILO sponsorship. UNIDO and ECLAC both had  
always advocated industrialization and equity. 
4
 See also Warr(1993,1999,2005) for nuanced analyses of the various aspects of Thailand's development 
experience and Jomo(2007,1995)  for Malaysia.. 
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It would seem, therefore, that there is an implicit agreement in at least the post-1970 
thinking  that development is "growth plus" other things. While the list of "other 
things" may vary somewhat, none of the researchers in the field today would equate 
growth and development. Yet, as almost  all would agree that generating high growth 
may be a useful means towards development. Many thoughtful researchers  also pay 
some attention to what can be called "the political economy of growth and distribution" 
 
Synthesizing the Experiences of the high growth Asian economies further reveals some 
common strategic orientations as well as the effects of changes in external environment 
and shifts in policies over time. This is consistent with the characteristics of complex 
economic systems which are nonlinear with multiple equilibria and path dependence. 
Over time, one may observe the emergence of structural shifts in some cases, 
stagnation in other cases depending on initial conditions, strategies, policies and 
external environment among other things.In the Asian cases discussed here, there are 
many specific variations within each. However, they also share to various degrees 
many specific features listed below. 
 
1. Strategic Openness to various degrees with Hong Kong, Singapore and Thailand 
being the most open and Viet Nam
5
 the least. But in all cases there is a strategic 
commitment to export promotion beyond an earlier period of strategic import 
substitution(SISI)
6
 and further goals of moving up the value added ladder. It should be 
kept in mind however, that there can be a "fallacy of composition"(Cline1982, Khan 
1983,Mayer 2002, Razmi and Blecker 2006) in claiming that all developing countries 
need to do is to pursue an export-led growth policy. Reciprocal demands may not exist 
sufficiently and the ensuing competition for export markets in developed countries may 
create winners as well as losers. Therefore, what may be needed in the future for other 
aspiring countries is a strategic approach including the development of national and 
                     
5
 However, see Thoburn et. al.(2007) for an insightful and nuanced discussion of Viet Nam's trade-
orientation and policies for the textiles sector. 
6
 On what I have called SISI, see Amsden(2008) and the references therein, 
Bruton(1998)Khan(2004a,b;1997,1985,1982a,b)  
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regional markets and the creation of dynamic comparative advantage along with a 
number of other policies and institution building processes described below. 
2. Heterodox macroeconomic policies for stability
7
---Here China and India have 
been the most heterodox. But Taiwan, Malaysia, Viet Nam and Korea  display more of 
a mix of heterodox policies than Thailand.Even Hong Kong and Singapore at times 
have followed heterodox policies, esp. on the fiscal side. It seems that the rigidity  of 
Washington consensus particularly in this area is rejected by the experiences of 
developing economies like China, India, Korea, Malaysia and Viet Nam.  
3. Creation of institutions for productive investment---this exists in all cases, but 
Korea seems to have gone much further than the others much earlier.Starting with the 
reforms in the 1960s, it moved through several successive stages and is now trying to 
find appropriate technological niche in a world that is moving towards a convergence 
of information, bio and nano technologies by 2050. The role of state in the creation of 
these institutions is still very prominent.In this respect, China perhaps has the most 
ambitious agenda which is discussed as a special case study later. 
4. Agricultural development--- all of them put enough of an emphasis but China and 
Viet Nam probably put through the most egalitarian pro-peasant development policies 
earlier. Korea and Taiwan also had an egalitarian land reform after the end of Japanese 
colonialism.  
Warr(2008:p.12) describes the importance of agriculture in the Thai case: 
 
The results of the analysis indicate that agriculture’s contribution to economic growth 
in Thailand included impressive rates of TFP growth. But its main contribution 
occurred 
through releasing resources which could be used more productively elsewhere, while 
still 
maintaining output, rather than through expansion of agricultural output. It is seriously 
wrong 
to characterize Thai agriculture as ‘stagnant’, based merely on the fact that output 
growth is 
slower in agriculture than in other sectors. If agriculture had really been ‘stagnant’ 
economic 
growth would have been substantially lower because it would not have been possible to 
raise 
                     
7
 See Jomo and Nagaraj(2001) for a good discussion of heterodoxy in this context. 
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productivity significantly within agriculture or to release resources massively while still 
maintaining moderate growth of output 
 
Viet Nam's reforms in Agriculture are evaluated by Thoburn(2008) in the following 
words: 
Rice, indeed, is the great success story of the agricultural reforms. Vietnam changed 
from being a net importer of rice in the 1980s to the world’s third largest exporter (after 
the US and Thailand) in the mid-1990s, though there has been little further export 
growth since the late 1990s, particularly compared to other products …. This lack of 
growth is not necessarily surprising or a sign of failure. In the late 1990s, when rice 
export growth was peaking, less than 15% of output was being exported …. In an 
economy where around 70% of households were both consumers and producers of rice, 
rises in rice output were important primarily for raising rural incomes and for food 
security, with the surplus available for export varying with fluctuations in domestic 
production.  
 
The state has played a role in encouraging new crops such as cashew, and later coffee 
…. Coffee is not straightforwardly a success story, though, as the expansion of 
Vietnam’s coffee exports in the mid-1990s was a factor in causing a substantial fall in 
the world price. 
 
 
5. Industrial development and structural change-- the strategic perspective in this 
important area suggests that the successful countries to various degrees pursued a 
continuously unfolding and dynamic set of policies with much trial and error. The 
retrospective attempts to tell a coherent story have often led to an overly deductive 
picture where good performances supposedly follow from a few , usually neoclassical 
economic principles. The Malaysian case study by Jomo and Wee is a good and 
convincing counterexample.Amsden(1989, 2008), Khan(1982a,b;1983,1997,2004a,b) 
and Wade(1990) discuss the cases of Korea and Taiwan in the general East Asian 
context. 
Jomo and Wee(2008:p.10) describe some changes in strategy and policy for Malaysia 
within specific time-sensitive contexts: 
 
Over the years, the government has changed its industrialization strategy. In 
response to problems and new priorities, the government announced the Second 
Industrial Master Plan (IMP2) for 1996-2005 in December 1996 to replace the (first) 
Industrial Master Plan (IMP) for 1986-1995. In September 1996, the government had 
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set up the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) to promote certain information 
technology investments. The government committed over RM50 billion for 
infrastructure development to support this initiative. At the same time, the government 
strengthened intellectual property laws to reassure foreign investors and provided more 
generous incentives for new investments in this area.  
Thus, the policy changes of the mid-1980s appeared successful in reviving 
growth and industrialization. Confirmation of the new policy direction from the mid-
1980s came with the 1991 enunciation of Vision 2020, favouring growth, modernization 
and industrialization. Although FDI began levelling off in the mid-1990s, increased 
domestic investments – inspired by greater domestic investor confidence – sustained the 
momentum of rapid economic growth until the 1997-1998 regional crisis. The gravity of 
the crisis and the difficulties of recovery were exacerbated by injudicious policy 
responses, compromised by cronyism, though there is little persuasive evidence that 
cronyism itself precipitated the crisis. 
 
They also point out changes in the sixties and seventies as well in response to changing 
global economic environment: 
The decline of rubber prices in the 1960s must surely have affected economic 
performance and policy. Malaysia’s experiment with import-substituting 
industrialization under foreign (principally British) auspices was quite different from 
most other developing countries where state-owned enterprises played leading roles as 
well as Northeast Asian experiences where effective protection was conditional on 
export promotion. Malaysia’s transformation from net oil importer to exporter in the 
mid-1970s, when petroleum prices rose sharply, allowed the government to spend 
much more, while the recycling of petrodollars later allowed it to borrow from abroad 
at low cost until the Volcker intervention of 1980 raised real interest rates and 
precipitated a global recession, bringing commodity prices down. (Jomo and Wee 
2008:p.14) 
 
The case study of Viet Nam also confirms the suspicion that there is much that is 
improvised and ad hoc during the earlier phases of apparently successful development 
cases. The lesson here is perhaps to avoid major resource allocation distortions( as 
documented by the Thai case discussed by Warr also) and constant monitoring and 
policy revisions when existing policies do not work well. 
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 6. Creation of technological capabilities--- here the Korean case stands out as a very 
apt illustration of creating technological capabilities throughout the entire growth and 
development trajectory in definite stages.
8
  
 As Lee(2008,pp.4-5) points out: 
 
Among various aspects of capacities, emphasis should be on technological capabilities 
because without these, sustained growth is impossible. In this era of open market 
competition, private companies cannot sustain growth if they rely upon cheap products; 
they need to be able to move up the value-chain to higher-value added goods based on 
continued upgrading and improvement and technological innovation. Furthermore, 
private companies had better be “local” companies, whenever possible, including 
locally controlled JVs, not foreign controlled subsidiaries of the MNCs. MNCs 
subsidiaries are always moving around the world seeking cheaper wages and bigger 
markets.  Therefore, they cannot be relied upon to generate sustained growth in specific 
localities or countries although they can serve as useful channels for knowledge transfer 
and learning. 
 
The Malaysia case study by Jomo and Wee  also recognizes this essentially strategic 
aspect of creating technological capabilities during medium to long run development. It 
is also clear from the China, Thailand and Viet Nam cases that strategic concerns with 
the creation of appropriate technological capabilities have been and continue to be very 
important. 
7. Technological learning and innovation--- creating national innovation systems in 
particular requires the creation of specific institutions and technological learning over 
time. Ultimately, if development is to continue beyond the catching up phase, this may 
present the most crucial set of policy challenges. Here, the paper on Korea by 
Lee(2008) is an admirable attempt to sum up the lessons. There are specific features 
here to which Lee(2008,p.5) draws our attention. 
Therefore, while the ultimate goal and criterion of development is to raise the 
capabilities of local private companies, the process needs pilot agencies to guide and 
coordinate the whole process. Such needs exist because key resources are so scarce, 
and thus had better… be mobilized for uses in sectors or projects with greatest 
externalities. As understood by Gerschenkron, who analyzed the latecomer 
industrialization of Germany and Russia, and identified latecomer agencies, such as 
                     
8
 See also Lee(2006) for a contrast of Korean experience with the Washington consensus and  
Khan(2008, 2002,1998 and 1997) for a discussion of the Korean  ( and Taiwanese)case(s) in the context 
of a distributionally sensitive growth model for positive feedback loop innovation system(POLIS). One 
possible nonlinear model of POLIS is discussed in the appendix. 
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large state-owned investment banks to drive the process in these countries, it is such 
agencies that can make up for gaps or lacunae in the country that is seeking to 
industrialize. All the east Asian countries built specific state-agencies that played a role 
of guiding the process of industrialization. In Korea the institutions established in the 
1960s under the Park regime included the Economic Planning Board to set economic 
plans; the Ministry of Trade and Industry to support industrial policy and export; and 
the Ministry of Finance to finance economic plans.  
 
 Both state and civil society have to play important roles. At an earlier stage, the state 
necessarily plays a  large and activist role . At a later stage, however, the creation of 
technological capability has to rely on a private-public partnership at both the 
precompetitive and the competitive phases of innovation(Khan2004a). 
8. Direct Foreign Investment and Foreign Aid--- these factors have played a role for 
all three but perhaps more so for Thailand, Viet Nam and Malaysia. Investment from 
abroad has perhaps been more significant than aid per se. However, internal generation 
of investible funds and public sector support have also played a crucial role---
particularly in Korea, Taiwan and China. DFI in manufacturing sector can be important 
as the Viet Nam ( and also the Thai and Malaysian cases) case shows: 
 
Sectorally, manufacturing has been the most important area for DFI, with 51% of 
accumulated registered foreign capital over the 1988-2006 period, followed by 
transport, storage and communications (9.6%), mining and quarrying (8%) and real 
estate (8%) . (Thoburn 2008, p.8) 
 
Not everything has to be of the best practice genre for DFI to come in as Thoburn 
shows for Viet Nam: 
 
Paradoxically, Vietnam scores badly on conventional measures of competitiveness and 
investment climate, yet is highly regarded by foreign investors who operate in the 
country. The World Bank’s Doing Business survey ranks Vietnam as 104th out of 175 
countries as a good place to do business. In contrast, the VDR for 2007 claims that 
Japanese inward investors see Vietnam as the third most attractive investment location 
in the world. It seems that Vietnam’s stable macroeconomic environment, high quality 
and low cost labour, and low levels of crime are more important considerations for 
investors than the details of bureaucratic procedures which are often included in 
international surveys. (Thoburn 2008 p.9) 
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Foreign Aid-- particularly Japanese aid--- has played a role in the development of 
Thailand and Malaysia but in the Asian cases the leveraging of aid for domestic 
development has perhaps been more important than the actual quantity of aid.
9
 
 
 
9. Poverty reduction strategies-- these are a varied set of policies that are necessary in 
addition to growth. Although growth is a very important component of  such a strategic 
approach to poverty reduction, in all cases specific policies targeting both rural and 
urban poverty were undertaken.Although in China, the period from 1995 on was a case 
of neglect or even reversal; but the current leadership seems to be aware of the political 
economic issues raised by such neglect and is committed publicly to reverse the 
reversal. In case of Thailand and Viet Nam, it can be argued, such attention for some 
time to come is still a necessary part of a coherent pro-poor development strategy. This 
suggests a "growth plus…"(Weiss and Khan2006) strategy for development. 
In addition to the nine sets of factors discussed above, there are also somewhat random, 
historically contingent factors.The case study on Malaysia acknowledges the presence 
of such factors explicitly. But even a quick look at the other cases will reveal 
historically contingent events ranging from momentous events such as wars and 
revolutions to more usual changes in domestic and international political factors and 
changes in policies that depended on crucial personalities such as that of President Park 
in Korea in the 1960s. As Jomo and Wee (2008,p.14) indicate in summing up the 
lessons from at least five different policy periods in Malaysia: 
It is difficult to evaluate policy success or failure simply in terms of subsequent 
economic performance. Malaysia’s very open economy has often been subject to 
circumstances not of its own choosing or making.  
The decline of rubber prices in the 1960s must surely have affected economic 
performance and policy. Malaysia’s experiment with import-substituting 
industrialization under foreign (principally British) auspices was quite different from 
most other developing countries where state-owned enterprises played leading roles as 
well as Northeast Asian experiences where effective protection was conditional on 
export promotion. Malaysia’s transformation from net oil importer to exporter in the 
mid-1970s, when petroleum prices rose sharply, allowed the government to spend 
much more, while the recycling of petrodollars later allowed it to borrow from abroad 
                     
9
 This is not to say that the quantity does not matter. Also for very poor countries today, aid can fill 
crucial financing gaps. See Khan(2003b) on these issues. For Japanese aid to China in infrastructural and 
energy related projects, see Khan(forthcoming,2009). 
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at low cost until the Volcker intervention of 1980 raised real interest rates and 
precipitated a global recession, bringing commodity prices down.  
The Plaza Accord of September 1985 led to the strong yen just as Malaysia’s 
sovereign foreign debt became yen-denominated. The mid-1980s’ recession 
precipitated a banking crisis, which led to the 1989 banking reform to the seeming 
success of earlier deregulation facilitated financial liberalization, culminating in the 
1997-98 crisis. The late 1980s’ regulatory reforms encouraged further limited private 
foreign borrowings from abroad before that, limiting vulnerability on that front. The 
East Asian economic recovery from the last quarter of 1998, following the Russian and 
LTCM crises, similarly does not allow proper evaluation of the impact of Mahathir’s 
controversial measures of early September as he moved to politically eliminate his 
deputy. 
 
 
What follows from the above identification of both the relatively necessary as well as 
the more contingent factors that have played a role is, I think, the need for taking a 
pragmatic and diagnostic approach to the problems of development and 
industrialization in the 21
st
 century. It is necessary to identify distortions. It is also 
equally necessary to identify market failures and other institutional failures. Instead of 
taking a grand, presumptive approach to development, the role of a mix of heterodox 
policies with the willingness to revise policies before the cost gets too high seems to be 
the best recipe for avoiding failures. 
 
In looking at institution building in the Asian cases, it is also clear that generally, it is 
easier to list the functions that good institutions perform than it is to describe the shape 
they should take. In fact, consistent with the complexity approach outlined here, there 
may be a wide variety of institutions serving roughly the same function. From the 
Asian cases, it is apparent that the desirable institutions provide a rough and ready type 
of security of property rights, enforceability of contracts and lead to a gradual and 
strategically conceived integration with the world economy. In addition, they also help 
maintain macroeconomic stability without a necessarily rigid conservative fiscal stance. 
Over time and given sufficient financial development, the state and private sector 
institutions should be able to manage risk-taking by financial intermediaries. In order to 
promote equitable growth there will also need to be institutions that can supply social 
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insurance and safety nets, and create a democratic space for voice and accountability. 
But there is no one-size-that-fits-all for any of these functions.
10
 
 
As Warr points out insightfully in the concluding section of his study of Thailand, in 
the Thai case, rapid growth has also been accompanied by high inequality and 
environmental degradation.This also true of China(Khan forthcoming2009, Khan and 
Liu(2007)). One important lesson that follows from this is that even if a country is 
successful in growing through a combination of strategies, policies and circumstances, 
without explicit attention to equity and ecology, sustainable growth and equitable 
development may not occur automatically but rather the contrary may happen.
11
 It is, 
then, an added imperative for the policy makers to include these salient goals in policy 
formulation and institution building. While no predetermined futures are foreordained 
in this complex world, some thoughtful diagnosis of these problems relatively early on 
may suggest solutions which can be implemented before it is too late. 
To sum up, the Asian cases offer a set of concrete examples of the growth and 
development experiences during the post WWII period. Although no country can 
succeed by following mechanically the experience of another country , as outlined 
above, a number of helpful policy and institutional insights can still be drawn out from 
these cases. In the spirit of experimentation with rapid feedback and flexible policy 
making informed by a strategic medium to  long run perspective, much can be done by 
the policy makers who are imaginative and pragmatic at the same time. Dynamic 
learning and flexible institution building are essential components of such a strategic 
approach to development. I now discuss the specific case of China in the specific area 
of building an innovation system for the 21
st
 Century. 
 
3. Chinese Industrialization and Innovation System: friend or Foe of Other 
Developing Economies? 
 
 
 
                     
10
 See Chang (2007) for a number of thoughtful contributions on this topic among other things. 
11
 See also Jomo et. al.(2004) and Khan(1997 and 2004a,b) 
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This section
12
 analyzes the available evidence of China's S&T, R&D, and 
innovative capabilities, to provide an  assessment of the effectiveness and potentialities 
of its national system of innovation (NSI) ), and to  formulate  some preliminary policy 
suggestions  aimed at improving China's overall innovation strategy. This last item, it 
will be seen, leads to the formulation of a somewhat novel modification and extension 
of NSI in the complex economic systems context. The idea of a positive feedback loop 
innovation system(POLIS) which will be formalized to some extent later is an 
ecological political economy approach to innovation and development in the 21
st
 
century that can be useful for China and many other countries. 
China's innovation strategy aims at embodying world-class best practices from 
technological world leaders and successful late industrializers, but is also peculiarly 
Chinese in at least two crucial aspects. The first is China's sheer size, which has 
allowed her to leapfrog to rank 2 worldwide in terms of the absolute quantitative 
magnitude of its NSI, at a stage when it still far lags behind all technological leaders in 
terms of per capita educational, technological, and research  achievements. The second 
is China's specific form of market “socialism”, which has the potential of conferring  
her leaders an outstanding advantage in the crucial area of strategic planning, i.e. the 
capability to master national resources and to earmark them towards key goals 
accordingly to a clear set of priorities. 
China's goal is to engineer in a relative short period a decisive qualitative leap 
in her NSI, developing a systemic ability to generate world-class indigenous 
innovations. In addition to fostering technical progress, China's development strategy 
shall also take into account the challenge of establishing a model of innovation 
compatible  with an equitable pattern of income distribution and  environmental 
sustainability,  thereby paving the way to the eventual evolution towards a higher and 
more developed form of socialism. This is the expressed aim of the Chinese leadership. 
However, the simple NSI approach is not necessarily sensitive to these strategic 
requirements, and therefore there is a need for more advanced analytical and planning 
tools. In this context, I propose to consider the utility of nonlinear models of the POLIS 
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(positive feed back loop  innovation system) class, which are suitable to chart 
strategically the market “socialist” course, as their internal logic is consistent  with 
China's unique catch up strategy. 
 
 
By the turn of the century, China's R&D sector was growing rapidly in size 
and effectiveness, yet a major reorientation of resources towards research activities 
had not materialized yet. Major policy changes had been taking place in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and China's R&D system was undergoing two main and apparently 
contradictory, but in fact potentially complementary transformation trends. On one 
hand, there was a powerful drive towards commercialization and decentralization. On 
the other hand, the government was earmarking large resources and according an 
increased degree of priority to a new generation of national research programmes. The 
innovative capacity and the technological level of Chinese productive enterprises 
were improving, particularly so in the state-owned sub-sector, where managing 
practices and property relations were undergoing major changes (Gabriele 2002). In 
the late 1990s and early 2000s China kept investing heavily in its R&D and S&T 
sector, and reforming its NSI. Similar patterns, to a lesser extent, were observed in 
other semi-industrialized developing countries. 
In the meantime, further evidence is accumulating on the key role of R&D in 
boosting economic growth (see David et al. (2000), Arora et al (2007)) and on global 
technological trends, which point towards an ever-increasing divergence between 
developed and developing countries. Only China and (possibly)4 a very small group 
of other semi-industrialized countries are beginning to close the technological gap 
separating them from the world leaders (see Fagerberg, Knell, and Srholec (2007)). 
However, there are also signs of a sort of "research and innovation fatigue" which 
appears to be emerging in the developed world. 
 
3.1. China's NSI and the linkages between industry and science 
China's NSI has witnessed remarkable advances since the early 1980s, as a 
result of a series of reforms aimed mainly at improving its effectiveness and closing 
the excessive gap which traditionally separated university-based research activities 
from the technology absorption and innovation needs of the enterprises system. The 
main thrust of reforms has been to diversify the country's NSI and to strengthen its 
market-orientation (or market-compatibility), but the role of centrally-managed large, 
long-term research programs has also been enhanced. These reforms, along with the 
ever-expanding availability of financial resources made possible by economic growth 
and by the strong role of the national state, have allowed China to achieve remarkable 
advances. As a result, for instance, China's NSI is far superior to that of the other 
Asian emerging giant, India, in virtually every aspect (see Dahlman (2007), Schmitz 
and Stamm (2007), Kash, Augur, and Li (2004), Hung (2008)). 
                                                            
12
 This section draws upon my joint work with Alberto Gabriele of  UNCTAD. It does not reflect the 
official views of UNCTAD or any other UN organization. 
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Several organizational and institutional structures which proved their validity 
in the context of developed market economies are also being studied, experimented, 
and in some cases adopted in China, but such a pragmatic approach does not amount 
to an attempt to ape western examples. Actually, "It is far from clear that evolving 
into an innovation system similar to that found in developed market economies is a 
possible or even advisable objective for China or other countries emerging from 
central planning regimes and Soviet-style industrial organization….". On the 
contrary, "it is necessary to accept the possibility that fundamentally different but 
equally viable national innovation systems could emerge in China, other formerly 
centrally planned economies, or other nations with similarly very different legacies of 
industrial organization and social systems ….Policymakers would then be able to 
better evaluate which system structure is most appropriate, given the particular 
characteristics of their national context and the costs and likelihood of successfully 
introducing changes to move towards an alternative system structure" (Liu and White 
(2001), p.1112). 
The most visible change in China's NSI is probably the progressive shift of the 
bulk of R&D activities away from universities and specialized research centres and 
towards industrial enterprises. However, universities participate in 
many of the most ambitious basic research endeavours, and often play a crucial role in 
their implementation. For instance, universities carry out about 1/3 of the "863 
projects" and 2/3 of the projects funded by National Natural Science Foundation 
(NNSF) (Wu (2007), Hu and Jefferson 2004). In order to re-balance the roles of the 
different actors in the R&D scene in favour of the academia, the Chinese government 
is earmarking an increasing volume of funds to elite universities, mainly through the 
Ministry of Education (MOE). Elite universities are expected to lead in national R&D 
programs and projects, facilitate technology diffusion and pullovers, promote spinoff 
companies, incubation centres, and open laboratories for R&D sharing, to bridge  
foreign technology and partners. This emphasis on the role of universities in 
engaging directly in the development, production, and commercialization stages of 
their research results has been dubbed "forward engineering " by Lee. According to 
him, forward engineering is a peculiarly Chinese component of the "Beijing 
Consensus", a comprehensive and proactive catch-up strategy very different from the 
"Washington Consensus" and partly, but not fully similar to that followed before by 
other successful Asian latecomers such as Korea and Taiwan (see Lee 2006a, b and 
Lee, Hanh, and Justin Yifu 2002). Among other initiatives, a very important one was 
project 211, aimed at funding the construction of campuses and developing new 
academic programs in key scientific areas all over the country (Hsiung 2002) during 
the 1996-2000 Five year plan period. 
. 
Other programs promote specifically university-industry links. The first one of 
this kind was launched jointly in 2001 by the State Economic and Trade Commission 
(SETC) and the MOE. The goal of this program was to set up state technology 
transfer centres in six universities, in order to promote the commercialization of 
technological achievements. After a long debate that concluded with the official 
position that universities have a threefold mission - research, teaching, and 
commercialization - MOE issued another directive in 2002, encouraging the 
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development of university start-up enterprises. Research and technological 
innovations are seen as crucial channels through which universities contribute to 
national and local economies. (see Ma 2004, Zhang 2003, (Haiyan, Yuanlong and 
Kaiyuan 2006, Hong 2006, Motohashi 2005). 
As mentioned above, however, the bulk of China's R&D is presently being 
carried out by enterprises, many of which are large SOEs. China's large SOEs not 
only did not die out, but have managed so far to resist and even to thrive after over a 
quarter-century of market-oriented structural changes. SOEs reforms were carried out 
in the framework of a complex, ever-changing and opaque institutional environment, 
characterized by a weak and ambiguous -albeit increasing- degree of protection of 
property rights in general and of intellectual property rights (IPR) in particular. 
Shedding light on this apparent (for orthodox economics) paradox, most studies on 
innovation among Chinese productive enterprises found that substantial progress was 
going on, and that SOEs were capturing the bulk of S&T resources, but exhibiting a 
less-than-satisfactory capability of translating them into true production 
improvements. The innovative capability of SOEs, however, appears to have been 
further enhanced in the mid-2000s6, thanks at least partly to the economies of scale 
and scope made possible by the "grasping the big, enlivening the small" policy. The 
combined profit of the 150 or so companies controlled by China's central government 
reached Rmb1,000bn (USD140bn), more than 200% higher than five years earlier. By 
end- 2007, the list of the world’s 10 most valuable companies contained four groups 
controlled by the Chinese state7. The behaviour of Chinese SOEs is also becoming 
more modern and effective in a number of areas, including their ability to attract top 
executive talents (Dodson (2008). 
In China as elsewhere, R&D expenditure is positive and significantly 
correlated with firm productivity. The contribution of government R&D to firm 
productivity works mainly through an indirect channel, via the promotion of firms' 
own R&D, which appears to be a more effective policy tool than direct R&D grants. 
Other key sources of production improvement and innovation growth are each firm's 
absorptive capacity, the production network, openness, and managers' education. 
Market-oriented, competition-enhancing innovation system reforms are improving the 
effectiveness of the incentive structure and fostering S&T linkage activities. With 
respect to the impact of ownership type, SOEs perform worse than collective and 
private firms in terms of production performance, but not in terms of innovation 
capabilities grants (Guangzhou Hu (2001), Guangzhou Hu and Jefferson (2003), 
Motohashi and Yun (2007)). The choice of innovation types among Chinese SOEs 
depends on the turbulence in the environment, and on the organizational resources, 
with market forces and internal governance simultaneously influencing SOEs' 
innovation patterns (Li, Liu, and Ren (2007)). In many SOEs, managers apply the 
technical innovation audit tool for benchmarking, thereby improving their ability to 
choose among different types of innovation mechanisms. 
Due to the influence of the two main stakeholders (government and end users), 
firms with a higher degree of government involvement and a correspondently 
lower degree of openness to the market exhibit a more widespread use of innovation 
mechanisms, thereby apparently contradicting the positive relationship between 
market focus and innovativeness traditionally posited by “Western” innovation 
 20 
management theories. Therefore, "entering an open market abruptly may not be the 
solution for SOEs, which are rooted in a socialist economy, to become more 
competitive and more innovative" (Ren, Krabbendam, and de Weerd- Nederhof 
(2006). SOEs tend to prioritize the fulfillment of administrative tasks and 
"empirebuilding"ventures, whereas non-state firms tend to be more profitable in the 
market(Li and Xia (2008)). With the term "empire-building", Li and Xia refer to SOEs' 
managers' propensity (which they attribute to "agency problems"), to pursue "longterm 
investment and meeting new product output target, at the cost of high level of 
slack and inefficiencies…"(p.41). SOE's managers are "less concerned with the lack 
of legal protection of property right. Thus, compared with their non-state counterpart, 
they are relatively more likely to invest in projects with a longer payback cycle" 
(p.45). This phenomenon is due largely to strong government interference in SOEs' 
behavior, in a context of relatively weak IPR protection. The government puts a 
paramount emphasis on long-term investments and makes a great effort to promote 
technological innovations, targeting them as important indicators of SOE performance 
and awarding resources to SOEs accordingly). SOEs, rely more on government 
allocated resources, and therefore tend to perform better in areas that are encouraged by 
the government, such as new product development. As new product output is an 
important indicator of SOE performance, SOEs are incentivized to operate at 
thefrontier of new product development ( Li and Xia (2008) ,MOST, 2005). In our 
view,in spite of the relevance of static inefficiencies and distortions, SOEs' "distorted" 
behavior in the static sense can be associated with dynamic advantages in terms of 
innovative capacity and technological progress, with major spillovers benefiting the 
national economy as a whole. One also needs to take into account the existence of 
virtuous synergies with the non state-owned sector. 
 
Notwithstanding China's NSI’s remarkable strengths, remaining challenges are 
formidable. For instance, Wang (2006) identifies a dualistic pattern in China's of 
technological development, with the export-oriented segments of the economy being 
relatively isolated from those producing mainly for the domestic market. Zeng and 
Wang (2007) stress the weight of constraints such as an insufficiently developed 
institutional framework, relatively low overall educational attainments, the lack of a 
large pool of world-class talents, the embryonic stage of indigenous innovation 
capacity, and insufficiently developed linkages between R&D and industrial 
enterprises. Other researchers point towards China's persistent weaknesses in 
technological cooperation between universities and industry, the inadequate 
integration of the country's NSI into the global innovation networks, and the need to 
develop a comprehensive , more refined technological strategy in order to achieve 
effective technology transfer from foreign technological leaders, while at the same 
time maintaining an appropriate balance between indigenous innovations and 
technology imports (see Li-Hua (2007), Haiyan, Yuanlong and Kaiyuan (2006), Li- 
Hua and Simon (2007)). 
3.2 Recent evidence on China's innovative capabilities 
3.2.1. Indirect and comparative evidence on China's technological progress 
Growing quantitative evidence is becoming available on various aspects of 
China's economy, institutions, and innovative capabilities, and they broadly converge 
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towards suggesting that China is in fact climbing fast the economic and technological 
development ladder. Figures on economy-wide and industrial GDP, export, and labor 
productivity growth are too well known to be worth mentioning here. S&T, R&D and 
high-tech trade indicators are discussed in Section 3.2.2. Various other sources mention 
statistics bearing indirect evidence of China's growing technological power. Fortune's 
2007 list of the top 500 global corporations includes 24 Chinese firms, four more than 
in the previous year. This figure is still far from that of US global companies (162), 
and also quite lower than Japanese, French, and German companies, but it's higher 
than the number of Korean, Indian and Taiwanese companies (Yoshida 2007). 
Intriguing comparative evidence on companies' productivity growth and 
propensity to innovate appear to show that Chinese firms are doing reasonably well, 
European firms are maintaining their positions and ( surprisingly) US firms are 
losing ground (see Suh 2008). Productivity growth in China is more than three times 
the rate of that in the US and Europe. A survey carried out on more than 500 chief 
information officers (CIOs) in the US, Europe, and China provides even more striking 
results. Only 32 % of US executives and 41% of Europeans said they wanted to be 
early adopters of new technologies, compared to 70% of Chinese CIOs (Mayberry, 
Wang, and Suh 2006. see also Accenture 2007, 2008). Consistently, 70% of 
companies in China are committing most of their business to web services, against 
42% in Europe and 38% in the US: "As companies use these new standards for 
communicating with other systems, people and companies, they cut manual business 
process costs to one- tenth of current levels and can flexibly change features and 
services in less time for substantially less money….. Newer systems, during this 
second wave of web-based innovations, outperform older technology. These 
technologies have improved substantially in the past five years, making them easier to 
implement. As a result, more business processes will be online, driving higher levels 
of productivity" (Suh 2008). Moreover, many indicators on productivity, revenue and 
profit growth show that US companies are doing significantly worse than what 
conventional data on productivity growth might suggest. Among US S&P 500 large 
companies, employee growth was faster than both revenue and profit growth in 2001- 
2005. Thus, the growth of average revenue gains per employee was 58% lower than 
total average revenue growth, and profits per employee growth were only 75% of total 
profit growth. In contrast, among US S&P 350 companies recorded revenue and profit 
growth rates higher than employee growth rates. 
Further indirect evidence of major advances in the areas of governance, 
management, and technology in China's industry is provided by the very marked 
improvements in SOEs' economic and financial performance. In the aftermath of the 
1997 Asian financial crisis, China's SOEs sector, long plagued by the traditional 
deficiencies common to most publicly-owned productive enterprises, saw its average 
profit margins fall close to zero, with many firms reporting big losses. The prevailing 
wisdom, even among many Chinese observers, was that "since good performance 
does not guarantee that the incumbent manager will stay long, the manager does not 
have long-term incentives…. these built-in problems of state ownership cannot be 
solved by state-dominated corporatization…To ensure that only high ability people 
will be professional managers and that managers can be well disciplined, the authority 
of selecting management must be transferred from bureaucrats to capitalists. This 
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calls for privatization of both state enterprises and state banks "(Zhang 1998). 
After ten years of restructuring, which implied a dramatic decrease in 
employment and in enterprise numbers but also massive injections of capital and 
technology and a major leap in managers' and workers' education and skills, the SOEs 
sector is in good financial health. In 2007, the profits of the core 152 firms controlled 
by the central government was about Rmb 1000 bn (USD 140 bn), more than 30% 
higher than in 2006 and over 200% higher than five years earlier. The rate of return 
was 11.7%, 1.3% higher than in 2006. 139 enterprises (more than 90 percent of core 
SOEs) increased their profits year-on-year… period, and 18 of them recorded profits 
of more than 10 billion Yuan, against 14 a year earlier" (Chinaview 2007). 
Shipbuilding, automotive and shipping enterprises are becoming significant profit 
earners, along with petroleum, power generation and telecom companies. 
In this respect, there is a sub-sector that of cellular phones, where Chinese 
enterprises might soon achieve global leadership, thanks inter alia to their unique 
technological change pattern. Domestic producers' competitiveness in the world's 
largest cell phone market has been buoyed by the Chinese government's October 2007 
decision to eliminate all licensing requirements to manufacture and sell mobile 
phones in the country, thereby opening the gate for newcomers, some of which have 
been selling phones in the black market. Differently from Japan, which has been quite 
innovative in the past but mainly produced models sold only in the local market, 
China is presently using the same technologies as the rest of the world. This important 
difference could induce Chinese manufacturers to launch fast-forward innovations 
with the goal of increasing their domestic market share, thereby ending up producing 
phones that will be competitive (ex post) also in foreign markets. New Chinese brands 
are making progress in the areas of brand name, research and marketing development, 
and appear on the way to close the gap with foreign brands. They might be 
particularly successful in the huge and fast-growing rural market, Rural customers are 
more price-sensitive than in the cities and "do not have strong brand loyalty, so they 
buy things which can give them the best value. To cater to such values, home-grown 
brands pack more features into their phones, making people think they can get more 
value from these products…Among the new entrants of home-grown handset vendors; 
Beijing-based Tianyu is a rising star. It expects to sell 13 million mobile phone units 
in 2007, a 113.1% growth year-on-year to become the third biggest domestic handset 
vendor in China. …" (Chung 2007). Other strong and innovative firms are CECT 
(which has launched a model with biometric security features) and Meizu. These 
companies "seem to be building up a global customer base attracted by the feature 
sets of the phones, which aren’t provided by the global brands…. It’s also pretty 
inevitable that there will a breakthrough product, one that just happens to meet an 
unexpected demand, and that will really bring Chinese phones to global 
attention"(Trigram.wordpress.com 2007). 
In sum, China is trying to create a group of larges leading SOEs in highly 
competitive sectors, where technology, design and marketing capabilities are key for 
ultimate survival, thereby overcoming a traditional weakness of public enterprises 
worldwide (Dyer and McGregor (2008). The ultimate outcome of this major 
upgrading and restructuring exercise in China's public industry will clearly play a 
crucial role in shaping the country's development model. 
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3.2. 2. R&D and S&T indicators 
. Input indicators show that China not only earmarked huge and ever-increasing 
resources towards research, science, and technology, but also intensified its efforts in 
relative terms, thereby exposing a strong and effective pro- R&D and S&T bias in 
both government and business sector policies. Gross Domestic 
Expenditure on R&D in nominal terms almost tripled (in nominal terms) in the early 
2000s, reaching 300 bn Yuan by 2006. In a period of very fast economic growth, the 
GERD/GDP percentage ratio also increased markedly, from .95 in 2001 to 1.42 in 
2006. This figure is beginning to approach the 2% benchmark which is commonly 
considered a rule-of-thumb indicator signaling that "a country is sufficiently 
technologically sophisticated to help ensure technology-led economic growth." 
(OECD 2007). The business sector is the main contributor to total R&D expenditure 
(almost 70% in 2006), with most of the remainder being provided by the government. 
Sector-wise, over 70% of China's R&D is carried out by the business sector (which 
also employs almost 2/3 of the country's R&D personnel) and about 19% by research 
institutes. 70% of China's R&D workforce focuses on experimental development, 
20% on applied research and almost 10% on basic research. 
 
Roughly a half of total R&D is concentrated in the manufacturing industry, 
representing about 2% of its total value added. However, the latter indicator is more 
than twice as much in the high-tech industries, and reaches almost 14% in the aircraft 
and spacecraft sub-sector (see Table 1.3). Government S&T appropriation reached 
168.8 bn yuan in 2006, more than twice the corresponding figure for 2001. 
Government S&T appropriation also increased as a percentage of total government 
expenditure (3.7 in 2001 to 4.2 in 2006), with a high level of priority being accorded 
to special projects and operating funds. S&T personnel reached over 4 million and 
R&D personnel (mostly scientists and engineers) 1.5 million. 
 
Patents granted by SIPO (State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s 
Republic of China) in 2006 were almost 270000, more than twice the corresponding 
figure for 2002 and six times that of 1996. Over 22000 patents were granted to 
Chinese nationals (up from about 17000 in 2005) and 44000 to foreigners. However, 
most domestic patents were granted for utility model and design innovations. In the 
subset classified as true "inventions", successful foreign applicants outnumbered 
Chinese nationals, although the share of invention patents granted to the latter (43%) 
increased from that of the previous year (39%). Over half of all domestic service 
invention patents were generated in the business sector.  
 
China published over 400 thousand S&T papers in 2006, almost twice as much as in 
2001.More than half were produced by universities, but the fastest rate of increase was 
recorded by publications stemming from medical institutions. Chinese S%T papers 
indexed by SCI, EI, and ISP were 172 thousand in 2006, almost three times more than 
in 2001. The share of Chinese S%T papers indexed by the main international 
specialized institutions also rose significantly, reaching more than 42% by 2006. 
 
China's high-tech trade expanded at an extremely fast pace. Exports increased 
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twenty-fold in 1996-2006 period, reaching 2.8 USD bn by the end of the period. Their 
relative weight also rose, and by 2006 it had climbed to about 30%, both with respect 
to manufacturing exports and to total exports9. High-tech imports increased at a 
slightly slower pace, and as a result the high-tech trade balance turned positive in 
2006 for the first time . China's high-tech trade is heavily concentrated on the 
computers & telecom sub-sector, with over 2.2 bn exports and a 1.5 bn surplus in 2006 
. 
 
Available simple international comparative indicators of R&D inputs and 
outputs confirm the basic features of an overall scenario in which China has 
undoubtedly joined the worldwide Ivy League, pouring towards the research sectors 
enormous and ever-increasing human and financial resources. China's R&D effort far 
outpaces that of other large, semi-industrialized countries such as Brazil and India, is 
far ahead of many countries formerly seen as among the most industrialized ones, 
such as Italy. However, they also show that China still lags behind the US and the 
other members of the small group of world technological leaders in the most 
advanced areas. In terms of R&D intensity of the national economy, measured by 
the GERD/GDP percentage ratio, China has clearly left behind Italy, Russia, Brazil, 
and India, but still lags behind the four world R&D leaders: US, Germany, Japan, and 
Korea. The two Asian countries, in particular, lead the field in terms of R&D intensity 
with GERD/GDP ratios close to or larger than 3%, more than twice China's ratio 
(Table 4.1.). Data on the distribution of GERD resources confirm the findings 
reported in para 3.1., above, i.e. that China's R&D activity - consistently with its 
present level of technological development - is much less focused on basic research 
than that of any other major player, including Russia. The absolute size of China's 
R&D personnel army (over 1.5 mn) far outnumbers that of any other country, yet in 
relative terms (R&D personnel per 10,000 labor force) it is less than one tenth that of 
Japan, Germany, and even Russia . 
In absolute, nominal (i.e. dollar-denominated) terms, China's Gross Domestic 
Expenditure on R&D appears to be only slightly over one tenth of that of the US, one 
fifth of that of Japan, and half that of Germany (still, it is over four times higher than 
Russia's and Brazil's). However, in this case the MOST data, albeit formally correct, 
are misleading, as they might induce to unduly underestimate China's true strength vis 
a vis the rest of the world: "While the dollar figure on China’s R&D spending is 
dwarfed by that of Japan and the U.S., the real value of its expenditure is higher, 
thanks to lower costs – putting China third globally, on the basis of purchasing power 
parity" (HIKPA 2006). In fact, the international R&D expenditure figures expressed 
in purchasing power parity (PPP)10 estimated by the OECD terms show a dramatically 
different picture. Having been growing at an exceptionally high annual rate of over 
20% (more than five times that of any other major industrial country), China's R&D 
expenditure reached 136 bn USD in 2006, the second largest in the world, surpassing 
that of Japan and equivalent to more than one third that of the US . 
Basic comparative indicators of international R&D outputs appear11 to show 
that China - having reduced rapidly its relative backwardness, especially in the early 
2000s - figures among the global leaders, as it ranks 4th worldwide in terms of 
domestic invention patents granted, 2nd in terms of indexed papers published, and 5th 
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in terms of SCI-indexed papers published . These data, however, 
are not adequate to provide firm evidence on a much-discussed issue, i.e. whether 
China's ability to translate R&D inputs into output is structurally lower than that of 
world technological leaders. 
 
3.2.3. Accumulation and technical progress 
Felipe et al. (2008) apply a Classical analytical framework to analyze in a 
comparative fashion the diverging patterns of capital accumulation, profit rates, 
investment rates, capital productivity, and technological change of China and India 
between 1980 and 2003. Their findings can be propedeutic to a deeper discussion on 
the relationship between China's pattern of economic development and its unique 
socioeconomic structure. 
China's accumulation process has been much faster than India's, thanks to 
China's investment rate (i.e., investment/GDP ratio), due in turn mainly to the fact that 
China has been reinvesting almost all her surplus, while India invested a much lower 
share.. In fact, as a World Bank study has recently pointed out, corporate sector 
saving – including by SOEs – is a key contributor to China's high rates of saving and 
investment: "At about 20 percent of GDP – double the share in the U.S. and France – 
retained earnings finance more than one-half of enterprise investment." (Kuijs, Mako, 
and Zhang 2005, p.3). Another important, and apparently contradictory finding, is that 
profitability has been rising constantly in India, but declining in China, so that the 
profit rate was much higher in the latter by the late-1990s. More worryingly, capital 
productivity12 declined in China, while it rose in India13, and - consistently - technical 
change was “Marx-biased” (i.e. of the labor saving, capital consuming type) in China, 
while it was broadly Hicks-neutral in India. 
In sum," India differs from China in terms of how much profit has been 
plowed back into investment. In China virtually all profits are reinvested, with the 
consequence that actual investment has outstripped the capacity provided by profit 
and has led to the creation of overinvestment and overcapacity. Why is so much profit 
reinvested in China? A large part of these profits come form State Owned Enterprises. 
These companies do not pay dividends and face incentives that are biased toward 
investment, as local officials are promoted largely on their success in generating 
economic growth, which comes through investment. Thus, a large part of these profits 
is used for capital expansion (as much as 20% of all investment in China comes from 
local governments) without efficiency considerations…" (p.752). 
The policy - initiated in 1994 - of non-payment of dividends was initially 
justified by the feeble and declining profitability of public enterprises, and by the need 
to recapitalize SOEs in the framework of a deep reform process aimed at streamlining 
and strengthening state industry, but by the mid-2000s it had been made obsolete by 
its own success. Actually, " The current non-payment of dividends implicitly 
assumes that there is no better use of SOE profits other than re-investment back into 
SOEs. Clearly, however, China faces urgent challenges in refocusing its public 
spending to improve key services. " (Kuijs , Mako and Zhang, 2005, p.7). It is also 
clear that, as a result of this policy, SOEs have been investing more than they would 
have had otherwise. The Chinese government has acknowledged this problem15, and 
began in 2008 to enact a cautious and still experimental policy change, collecting a 
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modest (5-10%) share of the profits of state firms under its direct control. The 
destination of these dividends has not been clearly specified yet, but they are expected 
to be channelled to both social consumption (i.e., financing social security funds) and 
investment in high technology sectors (see China Daily 2007, China.org.cn 2007, 
Shanghai daily (2007), Naughton 2008). This development surely goes in the right 
direction, but is still probably insufficient even to achieve the simple goal to curb 
excessive investment (see Chan 2007). 
Felipe et al (2008) attribute their findings largely to India's unfavourable 
institutional investment climate, and to China's bureaucratic push towards wasteful 
and inefficient investment. SOEs' bias towards wanton and inefficient expansion of 
investment, in particular, appears to constitute a major weakness of China's economic 
system. In our view, however, it is also important to see this issue in another 
perspective. Following Gabriele and Schettino 2008, we introduce the term 
"socialistic". Assume, as a mental experiment, a theoretical continuum of conceivable 
mixed socioeconomic systems, where on one hand there is a pure free-market, 
private-property based model of classical capitalism, and on the other hand a fully 
publicly-owned, centrally-planned socialist model. In this theoretical framework, the 
term "socialistic" indicates the property of being characterized by crucial systemic 
features in the domain of ownership, class, and other social relations of production 
and exchange which are relevant enough to position a specific socioeconomic 
formation rather strongly towards the socialist side. 
 
Our reasoning is crucially based on a proposition which we consider a 
relatively self-evident stylized fact, but which by its very nature cannot be 
demonstrated formally. The important differences in the patterns of accumulation and 
technical change found in the two Asian giants are in turn the product of another key 
difference, which is stemming from the very structural nature of their respective 
socioeconomic formations. Simply put, in India, but not in China, there is a fullfledged 
capitalist bourgeoisie structured and organized as the dominant class18 (see, 
for instance, Tsai 2008). Thus, China can be considered as one of the two presently 
existing members of a very small club that of a market-socialist or "socialistic" 
countries. India, conversely, is a "normal" capitalistic country. 
 
A very important corollary of this crucial systemic difference is that the share 
of surplus which finances the bourgeoisie's conspicuous consumption in "normal" 
capitalistic countries is virtually non-existing (or more precisely, carries a much lesser 
macroeconomic and strategic  weight) in China, and almost all the profits are 
reinvested. 
 
In a capitalistic economy, the shadow price of potentially investible financial 
resources in the framework of a long-term social welfare function to be maximized by 
policy- makers is likely to be lower than private capitalists' implicit discount rate. 
Therefore, taking for given the wage rate and hence workers' consumption, there 
would be room left for other investment projects, which would imply a relatively low 
but still positive rate of profit .Thus, it is usually the case under "normal" 
circumstances that the actual share of invested surplus in a capitalistic economy is 
lower than the one which would be optimal from a long-term social welfare 
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viewpoint24 (See Appendix). 
What happens, conversely, in an economy that is "socialistic", even if only in 
a weak sense, such as China, where the state is strong enough to effectively command 
(via direct appropriation and/or via institutional, administrative, legal, and informal 
mechanisms) the allocation of a major share of the surplus? Ceteris paribus, a country 
with such "socialistic" characteristics should invest a share of the surplus higher than 
that of a capitalist country. It is reasonable to argue that this is in fact the case in 
China - largely because a large share of total profits is earned by SOEs, which are 
mandated by the state to pursue a number of objectives different from profit 
maximization, among them investment expansion. 
According to our view, therefore, a socialistic society can exhibit a lower 
marginal productivity26 of investment than an otherwise similar capitalist one, and 
still exhibit an overall superior behaviour with respect to the determination of both the 
quantity and the quality of national investment.27 Whether this is in fact the case or 
not depends on the specific characteristics of the institutional framework shaping 
investment decision in a concrete socialistic economy, and can only be analyzed 
empirically on the basis of available data. Going back to the China-India comparison, 
it is known that the share of surplus that is plowed back to investment (which could 
also be called the investment/surplus ratio) is higher in China than in India. How 
much of China's additional (with respect to those which would be channelled towards 
capital accumulation in India, or another "normal" capitalist country) investment 
resources are rightly earmarked towards socially profitable projects - resulting in a 
lower marginal and average productivity of investment, but in a better long-term 
allocation of resources - and how much are totally or partially wasted ? 
A related but different question is as follows. The recent decision to let SOEs 
start paying a significant (even if still very small) share of their profits as dividend to 
the state is to be welcome. The destination of these dividends is still not very clearly 
defined, as there would be good economic and social reason both to earmark them to 
social consumption and investment (e.g., public health care and education), but also to 
keep prioritizing investment in infrastructure, key high-tech sectors, and R&D. Given 
the suboptimal state of China's basic public services, and the very long-term 
unsustainability of an already very high and permanently rising investment rate, it is 
plain that a high degree of the priority in the short term should be accorded to enhance 
social public consumption and investment. 
 
In the long term, however, assuming a stable and sustainable rate of accumulation is 
achieved, a more complex issue arises. 
 
For any modern socioeconomic formation, it is clear that the only way out of the 
putative Marxian(actually Smithian) law of tendentially declining profit rates is not to 
slow down 
accumulation per se, but to shift progressively more and more resources towards the 
development of high-tech and highly productive sectors29 and towards R&D and S&T 
activities in particular, striving to accelerate the rate of technical progress and to 
improve its nature. Actually, the pattern of technical progress should be made less and 
less Marx-biased, capital consuming in nature, and become increasingly Hicksneutral, 
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or even capital-saving. Such a major drive towards the quantitative and 
qualitative improvement of technical change patterns must be pursued, at least in part, 
independently from a key price-based signal such as the expected market-measured 
profitability of individual investment projects, in a market-compatible framework 
based on a modern and advanced form of planning. We refer to a form of resources 
allocation where a significant share of aggregate investment is allocated according to 
shadow prices based on a long term socially-oriented planning framework. This 
framework should internalize to the maximum possible extent those needs and 
externalities which do not stem from the price structure emerging spontaneously from 
the market - i.e. the "real" long-term social value of education, health, the 
environment, R&D itself, etc. An important component of this overall planning 
framework might be an embodied mechanism to shape in a dynamically optimal 
fashion the evolution of the price structure itself. 
3.3. Opportunities and Challenges: from NSI to POLIS? 
Since the late 1990s, the Chinese Government has approved a number of 
crucial strategic decisions to build up a world-class National Innovation System, seen 
as " a networking system composed of institutions involved in knowledge innovation 
and technology innovation (which)… includes the following: knowledge innovation 
system netted with the state research institutions and key universities; technology 
innovation and technology application system with industrial enterprises; knowledge 
dissemination system with schools and universities. In 1998 the government 
instructed the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) - a vast network of research 
institutes that are presently undergoing feverish expansion and reorganization - to 
initiate the Pilot Project of Knowledge Innovation Program (KIP)" (CAS 2008). An 
action plan was carried out for rejuvenating education in the 21st century, in addition 
to a national meeting on technology innovation and a working conference on basic 
science research, in order to further enhance the reform of the scientific research 
system. Plans are also drawn to open a second-board stock exchange in the securities 
market, similar to the American Nasdaq. The KIP piloted at CAS is a major 
component of the National Innovation System (see CAS 2008). 
In January 2006 China launched the “National Medium- and Long-Term 
Program for Scientific and Technological Development” (2006-2020), commonly 
known as the 15-year Plan for science and technology. The Plan's long-term goal is to 
allow China to become a pre-eminent global economic and technological power, 
relying on "independent, indigenous innovation":31 “By the end of 2020, we should 
establish an improved scientific and technological innovation system. . . We will 
strive to leapfrog the development of China’s information science and technology and 
to acquire core technologies with proprietary intellectual property rights in the IT 
sector.”(Quoted in AeA 2007). 
Not all the details of the plan were made public, but its main tenets are clear. 
China is foreseen to raise R&D spending from the current 1.4 percent of its economic 
output to 2 percent by 2010 and 2.5 percent by 2020:"these commitments would put 
Chinese R&D investments above $100 billion annually, placing it in the same league 
as Japan and the United States (RTM 2007). Acknowledging that China's high-tech 
industry is growing fast but is still largely dominated by multinational companies and 
centred on low-value-added, labor-intensive manufacturing, "the 15 Year Plan 
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intends to change that equation by investing heavily in such cutting-edge areas as 
nanotechnology and biotechnology to spawn indigenous innovation." (RTM 2007). 
Table 5 The 15-year Plan's 12 priority sectors 
Advanced Storage Technologies 
Alternative and Renewable Energies 
Biotechnology/Genetics 
Electronic Components 
Environmental Technologies 
Integrated Circuits/Semiconductors 
Manned Space Exploration 
Materials Technology 
Nanotechnology 
Network and Communication Technologies 
Optical and Biological Computing 
Software and Related Services 
 
Source: AeA 2007 
 
According to American Electronics Association (AeA), which carried out a 
synthetic assessment of the plan in 2007, (AeA 2007), the Plan's goals are ambitious, 
but not unrealistic. China has a leadership mainly composed by engineers, who are 
in a favourable position to understand the nature and the strategic centrality of 
research and technology, and has already built up remarkable elements of strength in 
the S&T and R&D area. For instance, it has being pouring huge societal investments 
into higher education and research (state financing for higher education more than 
doubled in 1998-2003, reaching over USD10bn by the end of that period; China's 
number of researchers increased by almost 80% in 1995-2004, and is now second 
only to the US). Large SOEs are also investing heavily in technological upgrading 
and human capital formation, and there are a number of start-up innovative firms, 
some of them already established in international markets (such as Lenovo, Haier, and 
Huawei), and others active in crucial areas such as the provision of Internet services 
for the domestic market. 
 
Yet, China also faces a number of challenges. Its high-tech industries are 
growing extremely fast, but they are mostly owned by foreign TNCs and still usually 
concentrated on low value-added stages in the value chain. In this respect, AeA 
(2007) quotes Daniel Rosen, a senior researcher in the Institute for International 
Economics, who half-jokingly remarked: “China’s high-tech exports turn out not to be 
so very high tech - nor, indeed, very Chinese.” Another key area of concern is 
constituted by weak IPRs protection - although the AeA rightly notes that the Plan 
acknowledges that China's own development interests are already shifting in favour of 
strengthening the IPR protection regime, and calls for action in this domain. 
AeA (2007) argues that it is also urgent to take decisive measures to reform 
capital markets, encourage risk taking, and let ideas flow more freely, to stimulate 
truly innovative thinking and research. To our view, many of these challenges are in 
fact crucial - a significant exception being, probably, capital market reforms. 
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However, it is not straightforward that the remedies should always go in the direction 
of following the US model (as AeA appears to suggest), taking into account the strong 
arguments in favour of fostering a smooth reform path towards a specifically Chinese 
NSI consistent with the country's history and its market-socialist socioeconomic 
system (see, for instance Liu and White (2001), Keun Lee (2006)). 
 
Finally, it is important to locate China's 15-year S&T Plan in the framework of 
the worldwide scenario shaped by the converging trends of key frontier technologies. 
As the APEC (2005) workshop on this topic has made clear, the convergence of 
information technology, biotechnology and nanotechnology (the so-called super 
convergence) might be the most significant technological event of the 21st century 
(see Khan 2005). The process of convergence is already underway. All the major 
national and regional players including USA, EU and Japan have already taken 
significant steps in order to maintain and gain further advantage in these technologies. 
China is a latecomer. 
 
What can China do in order to be in the same league as the three major players 
mentioned above? Taking into account the challenges posed by a very competitive 
international environment where the other major players still hold a significant 
advantage, China can achieve super convergence only through the creation of a 
selfsustaining innovation system that can move forward over time, This paramount 
strategic goal must be properly seen as the logical evolution of the present S&T 
strategy, basically centered around perfecting China's NSI, towards a qualitatively 
superior, self-propelling innovation system. The 15-year Plan, if successful, will 
complete the catch up process by 2020. Between 2020 and 2050, the strategic goal 
should be to build up autonomously advanced technological capabilities in the three 
crucial areas, with a view towards moving towards super convergence. Regional 
cooperation with Japan, Korea and Taiwan can play an important role in this strategy. 
Ultimately, a Pan-Asian regional innovation network including India and the ASEAN 
countries might also be established. China's National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) can start the process of national capacity building and regional 
cooperation by supporting key strategic ventures. Increasing the number of competent 
staff in the areas of planning for high technology development should be given 
serious consideration.  
 
In Khan (2008a,c, 2004a, 2002,1998) the overall planning framework is presented as 
part of a system-wide effort to create a positive feedback loop for innovation, which is 
at the same time distributionally progressive, equitable,and environmentally 
sustainable. The term used by Khan to refer to such a mechanism is that of nonlinear 
positive feed back innovation system, or POLIS.A simple model of complexity is 
presented at the end of this sub-section. A more complex model is given in  Appendix 
3).The POLIS framework can be applied through quantitative economy-wide modeling 
techniques, in order to analyze the challenges for transition from now to 2020 and 
then from 2020 to 2050. 
 
The POLIS approach is based on a somewhat novel theory of innovation in the 
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economy wide setting. Its first and most important feature is that the analysis of a 
POLIS can be thought of as part of the institutional turn in economic theory. 
However, in contrast with much institutional literature, its propositions can also be 
expressed in a formal language, through models that can be estimated quantitatively 
for both rigorous, empirical scientific testing and for policy making purposes. The 
starting point of the POLIS theory is the creative destruction process at the firm and 
industry level. However, an extension to an economy-wide setting requires the 
explicit theorization of the role of the state as well as an interacting nonlinear market 
process. The direction in which the theory leads is a complex interaction between 
state policies and market processes that influence the decisions taken by specific firms 
in particular areas of innovative activities. The key concept that is developed in this 
context can be called a Managed Creative Destruction (MCD) process. In a national 
(or regional) MCD, the creative destruction process characterizing innovation is 
structured more consciously by the state (or the states in a particular region). It can be 
argued that China is now going through this process. Following Schumpeter, we 
assume that innovation in specific firms can have economy-wide effects. As models 
based on this approach have multiple equilibria, the concept of a positive feedback 
loop innovation system or POLIS is formalized by picking an appropriate sequence of 
equilibria over time. It can be also shown that POLIS has empirical relevance by 
applying the formal model to an actual economy. Ultimately, technological 
transformation — in particular the creation of a positive feedback loop innovation 
system - is what makes the difference between sustained growth and gradual or 
sudden decline. 
In addition to the system wide approach to innovation over time, the POLIS 
theory offers two other distinct advantages. One is the linkage between micro and 
meso or macro levels. One can start with firm level data on innovation activities and 
link these to sectoral and intersectoral information flows. In this way, what happens at 
the firm level can be seen from a larger, economy wide perspective. At the same time, 
the impact of firm level activities on overall level and pace of innovation can also be 
ascertained qualitatively and quantitatively. 
 
The third aspect of POLIS is distributional. Since the complex system 
dynamics of POLIS is holistic, it integrates production with distribution. Thus the 
distribution of value added in production at both the factorial and household levels 
can be formulated as part of a general equilibrium (or, under circumstances of internal 
or external shocks, disequilibrium) frame work. Given the levels and distribution of 
income among households, the consumption patterns and effective demand feedback 
mechanisms complete the formulation of a system wide model. 
 
While acknowledging the impressive progress achieved so far, a 
comprehensive recent OECD study on China's innovation system (OECD 2007) 
concluded with a sobering warning: "China needs a better return on its fast-rising 
investments in research and development (R&D) and higher education if it is to meet 
its goal of becoming an 'innovation-oriented' economy by 2020…China still has a 
long way to go to build a modern, high-performance national innovation system.". 
This statement is realistic, as it stresses the uncertainties of the future without 
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underestimating Chinese government's firm strategic determination to achieve the 15- 
year Plan's goals. China's leadership seems to be fully aware of the centrality of 
science and technology, not only for economic growth, but also with respect to other 
crucial challenges, such as the ultimate environmental sustainability of its market 
socialist development model and for the sake of enhancing China's relative place 
among the world leading nations. Consistent with this goal, it has been earmarking 
towards research and the broader S&T sector an increasing share of China's 
fastgrowing 
GDP. As a result, China has now achieved a substantial critical mass in the 
area of research and innovation, second only (according to some estimates) to that of 
the US, and growing four times faster than that of any of the major world 
technological leaders, among which there are signs that the enthusiasm for 
everincreasing 
investment in R&D might be someway declining, both in the public and 
the private sectors. There is by now plenty of evidence showing that the over the last 
decade China has witnessed major efficiency-enhancing institutional and 
organizational changes, including in the area of property rights, a massive 
accumulation of human capital, and a very sustained rate of scientific and technical 
progress. Labor productivity has been rising fast, and a major part of the improvement 
is likely to be due to the aforementioned factors, even taking into account China's 
extraordinary rate of non-human capital accumulation. R&D input indicators and 
output indicators such as patents and scientific papers have been rising fast. Yet, a 
closer look shows that China is doing an excellent job at absorbing, adapting and 
developing existing technologies, but is still lagging significantly behind world 
technological leaders in terms of capability to generate state-of-the-art, world-class 
innovation proper, as is shown for instance by data on basic research and inventions 
patents 
. 
With respect to state industry, the assessment of available evidence on SOEs' 
performance is more complex. Most sources indicate that, until the end of the past 
century, SOEs had been absorbing a major share of investment funds while exhibiting 
efficiency and profitability levels lower than enterprises belonging to other forms of 
ownership. Yet, their propensity to innovate (not always in an effective way) was 
high, and their productivity climbed dramatically, especially during the late 1990s. 
Latest available evidence appears to show that, during the present decade, the policy 
of concentrating huge resources on a small number of large and advanced SOEs, 
while letting smaller and less efficient state enterprises to fend more or less for 
themselves ( recurring increasingly to extreme measures such as closures or 
ownership changes) has begun to bring significant qualitative fruit, as testified by 
core SOEs' increasing profitability and international competitiveness and by the 
embryonic emergence of some world-class state-owned TNCs. Both SOEs and large 
industrial enterprises operating in China under different forms of ownership - such as 
joint ventures and private (national and foreign) firms - manifest a very strong 
willingness to innovate, at a time when their counterparts in the US and - to a lesser 
extent - other OECD countries appear to show a sort of innovation fatigue. 
The economic sustainability of China's historically unprecedented S&T effort 
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does not presently appear an issue, at least in the short-to-medium term, taking into 
account the leadership's determination in prioritizing the S&T sector and the 
resilience of China's GDP growth rates, even in presence of diverse unfavorable 
exogenous phenomena such as the Sichuan earthquake and the overall slowdown in 
the international economy triggered by the US subprime crisis. 
As a result, China's NSI is undergoing major quantitative and qualitative 
changes. The latter are those which bear the most crucial weight. The main features 
of the 15-year plan appear to show that the basic tenets of the two-pronged S&T 
strategy outlined in Gabriele (1992) still hold. On one hand, the relationship between 
most R&D activities and the market is becoming closer and closer. Most of the R&D 
is already being carried out inside the enterprise sector, while universities and 
research institutes are intensifying their contacts with firms, and generating 
themselves start-up ventures to develop, produce and commercialize their 
innovations. The IPR protection system, in particular, is evolving towards a higher 
level of protection, partly to respect China's WTO obligations, but mainly to suit the 
present development stage, characterized by an increasing degree of 
commercialization of the bulk of technological knowledge ( essentially, the one 
stemming from applied research and development activities). On the other hand, in 
order to tackle the crucial weaknesses mentioned above, vast financial, human and 
institutional resources are being channeled towards a long-term basic research 
endeavor, concentrating on a limited number of strategic high-tech sectors. This major 
effort is articulated institutionally in a decentralized fashion, yet operates in a broadly 
consistent organizational and financial framework set up as a key component of 
China's specific form of strategic development planning. 
 
The challenge, at the present stage, is to engineer in a relative short period 
(10-15 years) a decisive qualitative leap in China's NSI, developing a systemic ability 
to generate world-class indigenous innovations. In addition to generating technical 
progress, China's development strategy shall also take into account the challenge of 
establishing a model of innovation compatible with an equitable pattern of income 
distribution and environmental sustainability, thereby paving the way to the eventual 
evolution towards a higher and more developed form of socialism. This is the 
expressed aim of the Chinese leadership, and also enjoys considerable popular 
support. 
 
However, the conventional NSI approach does not include a set of social and 
other informational requirements which are crucial to policy makers in order to steer 
successfully such a complex transition. Therefore, there is a need for more advanced 
analytical and planning tools. In this respect, we briefly refer to one particular 
approach, exemplified by the models introduced by Khan (1998, 2002, 2004a,b,c and 
2008a,b,c) within the context of nonlinear positive feed back innovation systems or 
POLIS. POLIS can be thought as a generalization of NSI that embodies distributional, 
ecological and other issues relating to socio-economic (and even political) 
development. Therefore, POLIS-type models are sensitive to many of the 
abovementioned concerns relevant to the strategy of development in China. POLIS-
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type models can be used to chart strategically the market socialist course, as their 
internal logic is also consistent with China's "walking-on-two-legs" catch up strategy. 
Actually, this strategy aims at embodying world-class best practices from 
technological world leaders and successful late industrializers, but is also uniquely 
Chinese in at least two crucial aspects. The first is China's sheer size, which has 
allowed her to leapfrog to rank 2 worldwide in terms of the absolute quantitative 
magnitude of its NSI, at a stage when it still lags far behind all technological leaders 
 
3.4   A ‘Simple’ Non-linear Model of Complexity and POLIS Motivated by the 
Chinese Experience 
  
 In order to give the reader some idea of the problem of formalizing complex 
technological systems motivated by the above case study of China in particular, we 
summarize here the basic structure of a ‘simple’ non-linear model embodying distinct 
technological systems which can be applied to analyze the technological trajectories in 
countries like China. At any single point in time, the model can be presented as a Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) representation of the socio-economic system.  The key 
distinction here is the explicitly non-linear nature of the economy-wide functional 
relationships. The key theorem shows the existence of multiple equilibria. Some further 
considerations of complexity and increasing returns show that multiple equilibria are 
indeed the natural outcomes in such models. Thus, there would seem to be some role 
for domestic policy in guiding the economy to a particular equilibrium among many. 
 
 The virtue of an economy-wide approach to technology systems is the 
embodiment of various inter-sectoral linkages.  In a SAM, such linkages are mappings 
from one set of accounts to another. In terms of technology systems, the production 
activities can be broken down into a production (sub-) system and a set of innovative 
activities. In practice, this presents considerable difficulties of classification and 
empirical estimation. 
 
 One major component of the entire innovation system is, of course, the 
expenditures on R&D.  In the SAM for Korea used here, this can appear either as an 
aggregate expenditure along the column labeled R&D, or as a set of disaggregated 
expenditures.
1
  In the latter case these may be specified according to productive 
activities (e.g., construction, electrical equipment, etc.) or by institutions (e.g., private 
R&D expenditures, government R&D expenditures, etc.).  It should be emphasized that 
the dynamic effects of R&D on the economy can be captured only in a series of such 
SAMs over time.  This approach is still at the conceptual stage, but appears to be quite 
appealing.  One can contrast the possible policy experiments that can be undertaken 
within such a framework with the apparently ad hoc science and technology policies in 
many developing countries. In particular, the impact over time of a POLIS can be 
traced by building and maintaining such SAMs. 
 
 Choice of new technology in a developing country is affected by research and 
development in at least three different ways. Such a country can attempt to develop 
new technology through R&D, as mentioned previously.  This ultimately requires a 
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positive feedback loop innovation system in order to be self-sustaining.  Another 
alternative is to adapt existing technology. This too requires a production system geared 
towards innovation in a limited way. A third alternative is to import technology or to 
acquire it through attracting foreign direct investment. In practice, all these different 
forms may be combined. The abstract model embodies all these different possibilities. 
However, the first option requires, among other things, a presence of multiple 
equilibria. In a unique equilibrium world the competitive equilibrium (under the 
assumption of complete markets) will always be the most efficient one. The presence of 
increasing returns usually destroys such competitive conditions.  
 
 We begin with a number of productive activities reflecting the existing 
technological structure. These activities are defined on the input-output subspace of the 
general and abstract mathematical space X. In addition to the values of inputs and 
outputs, points in this space could also represent household and other institutional 
income and expenditure accounts. We also incorporate the possibility of R&D as a 
separate productive activity. Formally, it is always possible to break R&D down into as 
many finite components as we want. The key relationship in this context is that 
between the endogenous accounts (usually, production activities and technologies, 
factors and households) and the exogenous ones.  It is this relationship that is posited to 
be non-linear and this together with some assumptions on the relevant mathematical 
space can lead to the existence of multiple equilibria. 
  
Although the existence theorems for these multisectoral models provide some structure 
for the equilibria as sequences of fixed points in the socio-economic structure with 
evolving technology systems, it is not specified a priori which equilibrium will be 
reached. The problem of equilibrium selection thus remains open. The idea behind a 
POLIS can now be stated somewhat more formally. It is to reach a sequence of 
equilibria so that in the non-linear models of the entire economy the maximal fixed 
points that are attainable are in fact reached through a combination of market forces and 
policy maneuvers over time. It is also to be understood that path-dependence of 
technology would rule out certain equilibria in the future. Thus initial choices of 
technologies can matter crucially at times. 
 
 The Model on a Lattice 
 
 Define X  as a vector lattice over a subring M  of the real field R .Let 
 0,|  xXxxx  
A non-linear mapping N  is defined such that 0,: 0   NXXN .  Given a vector of 
exogenous variables d , the following non-linear mapping describes a simultaneous 
non-linear equations model of an economy, :E  
dNxx            
 (1) 
for a given  Xd . 
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This non-linear system represents a socio-economic system of the type described 
previously.  In order to specify the model further, the following assumptions are 
necessary.  
1. X  is order complete 
2. N  is an isotone mapping 
3.   xˆ  such that dxNx  ˆˆ  
In terms of the economics of the model, the non-linear mapping from the space of 
inputs to the space of the outputs allows for non-constant returns to scale and technical 
progress over time. The 3 assumptions are minimally necessary for the existence of 
equilibrium. Assumption 3, in particular ensures that there is some level of output 
vector which can be produced given the technical production conditions and demand 
structure. 
 
Existence of Multiple Equilibria:  
Theorem: Under the assumptions 1 - 3, there exists  Xx
*  so that *x  is a solution 
of  
dNxx   
 Proof: Consider the interval    xxXxxx   ˆ0,ˆ|ˆ,0  where xˆ  is defined as in 
assumption 3.  Take a mapping F . 
dNxXxF  :  
F  is isotone and maps  x,0  into itself. 
Define a set   FxxxxxD  ,,0 . 
By assumption 3, D  is non-empty. 
We now show Dx inf*   is a solution to dNxx  . Dx inf*  ; therefore 
Dxxx  ,* . F  is isotone; therefore xFxFx *  for each Dx  implying. 
 ** xFx   
From (2) we have   ** FxFxF  . Thus DFx * ; hence ** inf FxDx   so, 
*** FxxFx  . Therefore ** Fxx  . 
This is an application of Tarski’s and Birkhoff’s theorem.  The key feature to note here 
is that the equilibrium is not necessarily unique.  It should also be noted that under 
additional assumptions on space X  and the mapping N  the computation of a fixed 
point can be done by standard methods (e.g. Ortega and Rheinboldt). 
 
Needless to say, any formalization of a complex system leaves out certain features. For 
example, the political features of POLIS are captured only indirectly and inferentially 
in the above model. But at least the ecological and distributive features can be captured 
by constructing the appropriate environmentally-sensitive SAMs and applying the 
model over time for a country like China. What the above verbal argument and formal 
exercise suggest is the feasibility of an alternative developmental model that builds 
upon some of the insights of the Asian success stories like China but also can take some 
necessary steps to face the ecological and political economic challenges of the 21
st
 
century. 
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4. Conclusions---Beyond the China Model: Making Globalization Work 
towards Sustainable Industrialization and Development 
 
The critical discussion of both the East Asian development experience and the Chinese 
innovation system leads to two conclusions among other things. The first is that these 
were exceptional cases even under the first phase of the US empire and will be 
impossible to replicate under the current rules of the game instituted by the US and 
other developed countries. Therefore, the current rules of globalization must change. 
The second conclusion is that even if these rules change and some other countries can 
move forward on the path of industrialization, the older 20
th
 century modes of 
industrialization based on fossil fuel based technology will not be sustainable. As 
Khan(2009, forthcoming) demonstrates, even for China the current strategy of 
development and patterns of energy consumption are unsustainable. In this particular 
work reported in Khan(2009, forthcoming) , I have sketched the energy dilemma for 
China in this century. As long as the current geopolitical situation persists, the pursuit 
of present development strategy of China will further increase its energy dependence. 
For both political and economic reasons, China needs to rethink its development 
strategy. I have sketched such an alternative strategy that relies much less on fossil 
fuels and emphasizes regional cooperation.In the present essay, I have shown how the 
NSI of China can begin to move towards an ecologically sustainable POLIS. This 
POLIS strategy will ultimately lead to a sustainable economy based on growth with 
equity. A transition to a non-fossil fuel based knowledge and information economy will 
also be easier to effect under the proposed strategy.  
 
However, time is of the essence. Given the path dependence of development unless 
strategic disengagement from the existing path followed by a strategic engagement with 
the alternative strategy is begun within the next five years, it may well be too late. The 
stakes are indeed very high. A more detailed strategy paper based on the key ideas from 
the alternative strategy outlined here with concrete quantitative scenarios and feasibility 
studies along the lines of models sketched in the Appendix (and other, more detailed 
models) will go some distance towards giving the appropriate analytical foundations for 
the policymakers. The preliminary results confirm the predictions regarding fossil fuel-
based energy shortage and lead towards a serious consideration of alternative energy 
sources. Achieving the twin goals of energy security and ecological balance are 
challenging but not impossible for China. Serious policy research can be used 
effectively if there is the political will to do so. The goal of regional cooperation is also 
achievable if patient negotiations in good faith can start in earnest. In particular, 
cooperation with other Asian economies, particularly Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam, and 
India will be crucial. This chapter has sketched out the complexities of cooperation and 
conflict between China and Japan. Future work will address the problems of Regional 
cooperation for China in the East, South, and South Asian context as well as in the 
context of Africa and Latin America. 
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Khan et. al.(forthcoming) shows this for the BRICS as a group. This paper 
investigates the relation between rapid economic growth and environmental 
degradation in the BRIC economies. It utilizes environmental, macroeconomic and 
financial variables coupled with Kyoto Protocol indicators based on panel data from 
1992 to 2004.In keepimg with the goal of examining long run sustainability, the long-
run equilibrium relationship between economic growth and energy consumption is 
examined. Feasible general least squares procedure (FGLS) is employed to estimate 
the environmental degradation caused by increases in energy consumption. Pooled 
regression analysis is used to estimate the relationship between energy consumption 
and growth variables. The impact of excessive economic growth rates on energy 
consumption levels is studied by means of threshold pooled ordinary least squares 
(POLS) method. Moreover, this analysis takes into account the legitimate econometric 
criticism of the Environmental Kuznets Curve highlighted by Stern (2004). The 
findings reveal that higher energy consumption leads to increased CO2 emissions in the 
countries under consideration.It is also found that rapid economic growth further 
inflates energy consumption levels in the emerging BRIC economies. The results of 
cointegration analyses also confirm these findings. Finally, the inclusion of the US and 
Japan as the world’s largest energy consumers does not significantly alter the results of 
our study.  
 
The implications of the study of China’s energy and innovation systems and of 
the long run growth implications of the BRIC economies for environment are quite 
clear. The crucial question is: what kind of transformations in the global economic 
environment and development discourse will influence the policies of these economies 
in the right direction. A related question is: how can the larger economies of the world 
play an enabling rather than a predatory role in furthering sustainable industrialization 
and development in all the countries including the LDCs? 
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Appendix 1: Growth impacts of the industrial and non-industrial  sectors – a 
simple SAM-based Model 
Fixed price modelling in a SAM-based framework 
In this section of the appendix, the social accounting matrix is presented as a 
data-gathering framework as well as an analytical tool for studying the effects of the 
energy sectors on growth. Appendix 2 presents the methodology for estimating the 
impact of growth generated by both the industrial and non-industrial sectors on 
poverty alleviation. The origins of social accounting can be traced as far back as 
Gregory King’s efforts in 1681, but more recent work stems from the attempts by 
Richard Stone, Graham Pyatt, Erik Thorbecke, and others.
13
 
In the methodological framework of this study, the SAM is used for mapping 
production and distribution at the economy-wide level. In this section, first a general 
SAM is described. Then it is shown how the method for studying the effect of growth 
within this framework follows logically from its structure. The model used is a simple 
version of a class of SAM-based general equilibrium models.
14
 It summarizes 
succinctly the interdependence between productive activities, factor shares, household 
income distribution, balance of payments, capital accounts, and so on, for the economy 
as a whole at a point in time. Given the technical conditions of production, the value 
added is distributed to the factors in a determinate fashion. The value added accrued by 
the factors is further received by households according to their ownership of assets and 
the prevailing wage structure. In the matrix form the SAM consists of rows and 
columns representing receipts and expenditures, respectively. As an accounting 
constraint receipts must equal expenditures. 
As is elaborated further in Khan and Thorbecke (1988), the SAM framework can be 
used to depict a set of linear relationships in a fixed coefficient model. For deciding the 
question of determination, the accounts need to be divided into exogenous and 
endogenous ones. For instance, in the China SAM, there are three endogenous 
accounts. 
 
INSERT TABLE A1 ABOUT HERE 
 
These are factors, households and production activities, leaving the government, capital 
and the rest of the world accounts as exogenous.
15
 
Looking at Table 7A2, which represents a SAM, we can see immediately that 
y n x   (1) 
1y t   (2) 
                     
13
  For a description of SAM as a data-gathering device, see Pyatt and Thorbecke (1976). Khan 
(1997) also has a chapter on this alone. 
14
 In Walrasian general equilibrium models the flexible price vector determines the equilibrium. In 
a Keynesian (dis)equilibrium model in the short-run the quantities vary while the price vector remains 
fixed. 
15
  See Khan and Thorbecke (1988: ch. II) for more theoretical details and empirical examples. The 
presentations here follow the cited work closely. 
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Now if we divide the entries in the matrix Tnn by the corresponding total income (that 
is, yn), we can define a corresponding matrix of average expenditure propensities. Let 
us call this matrix A. We now have: 
y n x Ay x     (3) 
 
1
1y A x Mx

    (4) 
M has been called the matrix of accounting multipliers by Thorbecke, for these 
multipliers, when computed, can account for the results (for example, income, 
consumption, and so on) obtained in the SAM without explaining the process that led to 
them. Let us now partition the matrix A in the following way (Khan and Thorbecke). 
13
21 22
32 33
0 0
0
0
A
A A A
A A
 
 
 
  
 (5) 
Given the accounts factors, household and the production activities, now we see that 
the income levels of these accounts (call them y1, y2, y3, respectively) are determined as 
functions of the exogenous demand of all other accounts. In this respect, what we have 
is a reduced-form model which can be consistent with a number of structural forms. 
This is quite satisfactory as far as tracing the effects of a certain injection in the 
economy is concerned or for prediction purposes when the structural coefficients are 
more or less unchanged. 
INSERT TABLE A2 ABOUT HERE 
One limitation of the accounting multiplier matrix M as derived in equation (4) is that it 
implies unitary expenditure elasticities (the prevailing average expenditure propensities 
in A are assumed to apply to any incremental injection). A more realistic alternative is 
to specify a matrix of marginal expenditure propensities (Cn below) corresponding to 
the observed income and expenditure elasticities of the different agents, under the 
assumption that prices remain fixed. The Cn matrix can be partitioned in the same way 
as the A matrix above. The most important difference between the two partitioned 
matrices is that C32  A32. Expressing the changes in income (dy) resulting from 
changes in injections (dx), one obtains 
d d dn n ny C y x   (6) 
 
1
d dn cI C x M x

    (7) 
Mc has been called a fixed price multiplier matrix and its advantage is that it allows any 
nonnegative income and expenditure elasticities to be reflected in Mc. In particular, in 
exploring the macroeconomic effects of exogenous changes in the output of different 
product-cum-technologies on other macroeconomic variables, it would be very 
unrealistic to assume that consumers react to any given proportional change in their 
incomes by increasing expenditures on the different commodities by exactly that same 
proportion (that is, assuming that the income elasticities of demand of the various 
socioeconomic household groups for the various commodities were all unity). Since the 
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expenditure (income) elasticity is equal to the ratio of the marginal expenditure 
propensity (MEPi) to the average expenditure propensity (AEPi) for any given good i, it 
follows that the marginal expenditure propensity can be readily obtained once the 
expenditure elasticity and the average expenditure propensities are known, that is,  
yi = MEPi/AEPi (8) 
MEPi = yi AEPi (9) 
and 
1i
i
MEP   (10) 
Thus, given the matrix A32 of average expenditure propensities, and the corresponding 
expenditure elasticities of demand, yi the corresponding marginal expenditure 
propensities matrix C32 could easily be derived.
16
 
                     
16
 See Khan and Thorbecke (1988) for some examples. See also Pyatt and Round (1979: 861). 
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Appendix 2:  Innovating and Other (including Energy) sectors, growth, 
distribution and poverty 
 
Multiplier decomposition, growth and poverty alleviation sensitivity 
 
Since poverty in the present context is measured by identifying a poverty line in 
monetary terms, incomes of the various household groups are the crucial variables. In 
particular, sectoral growth generated by the energy sectors must be linked to incomes of 
the various households in order to determine the exact extent of the alleviation of 
poverty through growth. The exact effect of income growth on poverty, of course, 
depends on the sensitivity of the adopted poverty measure to income. In this paper the 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT 1984) P class of additively decomposable poverty 
measure is selected for this purpose. For  = 0, 1, n this measure becomes the 
headcount ratio, the poverty gap and a distributionally sensitive measure that gives 
specific weights to each poor person’s shortfall, respectively.  
If we apply Kakwani’s (1993) decomposition to the P measure for specific sectors and 
households i and j respectively, the change in Pij can be written as follows: 
1
d d
ij ij
ij ijk
ki ijk
P P
P
y
 
 

 
 
 
  (11) 
Here Pij is the FGT P measure connecting sector j to household group i, yi is the mean 
per-capita income of household group i, and ijk is the income distribution parameter. 
Under the unrealistic but simplifying assumption of distributional neutrality: 
d dij i
i
ij i
P y
P y




 
  
 
 (12) 
where i is the elasticity of Pij with respect to the mean per capita income of each 
household group i resulting from an increase in the output of sector j. d iy  on the right 
hand side is the change in mean per capita income of household group i. This can be 
written as (by considering the fixed price multiplier matrix) 
dyc = mij dxj (13) 
where dxj is the change in the output of sector j on a per capita basis for group j. We 
can now rewrite the average change in poverty measure as 
d dij j
i ij
ij i
P x
m
P y




 
  
 
 (14) 
By aggregating across the household groups we can arrive at the overall poverty 
alleviation effect 
1 1
d d dm mj ij ij iji
i ij ij ij j
P P P P
P P P P
   
   

 
     
               
   (15) 
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Since we are considering a P measure  
  
  1 1
d dm kj ij
ij ij
z y zP P
P P z y z

 

 
   
       



 (16) 
where qi is the number of poor in the ith group and the total number of poor 
1
m
ii
q q

  
Let si be the poverty share of household group i (naturally 
1
1
m
ii
s  ) 
1 1
iq q
k l
i
k l
z y z y
s
z z
 

 
    
    
   
   (17) 
We can further rewrite the expression for the average change in overall poverty 
alleviation. 
1
d dmj ji
i
ij ij
P P
s
P P
 

 
 
   
 
  (18) 
Combining Equations 14 and 18, we now have 
d dj xj
i i ij
j i
P
s m
P y

 


 
  
 
  (19) 
Thorbecke and Jung (1996) separate the income increase via the modified multiplier 
effect from the sensitivity of the poverty measure formally in Equation (19) by defining 
the following two entities: 
– ijm = simij gives the modified multiplier effect in terms of income of a poor 
group. 
– qij = i(dxj/ iy ) represents the sensitivity of the poverty index to the change in 
income. I adopt their terminology and call this the poverty sensitivity effect. 
But each multiplier mij can be further decomposed: 
mij = jdij (20) 
where nj gives the (closed loop) interdependency effects and dij the distributional 
effects of a change in demand for the product of sector j on household group i. 
Thus 
d mj
ij ij
j
P
m q
P

 

  (21) 
   d
m
ij ij ij ij
i
r s q    (22) 
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The dij on the right hand side can be further decomposed by multiplicatively 
decomposing the total distributive effects. Given the structure of Cn matrix: 
D = D3D2D1 where D3 = (I – C22)
–1
; D2 = C21C13, and D1 = (I – C33)
–1
 
The particular element for each household i and sector j can be selected from these 
three matrices. 
Thus the contribution of an increase in output of a particular sector i to poverty 
alleviation can be decomposed multiplicatively into its two components: (i) the 
contribution due to the change in mean income of the poor across all groups and (ii) the 
sensitivity of the particular poverty measure to this change in average income of the 
poor. 
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Appendix 3: The POLIS approach and a more complex illustrative model 
 
 
 Multiple Equilibria on Banach Space for a POLIS model:   
 
 In this section the results for multiple equilibria presented in the main text are 
extended to functionals on Banach Space. We can define the model presented in 
section 3.4 again for monotone iterations, this time on a non-empty subset of an 
ordered Banach space X . The mapping XXf :  is called compact if it is 
continuous and if  xf  is relatively compact.  The map f  is called completely 
continuous if f  is continuous and maps bounded subsets of X  into compact sets.  
Let X  be a non-empty subset of some ordered set Y .  A fixed point x  of a map 
XXN : is called minimal (maximal) if every fixed point y  of N  in X  
satisfies 
  xyyx   
Theorem: Let  PE, be an ordered Banach space and let D  be a subset of E .   
Suppose that EDf :  is an increasing map which is compact on every order interval 
in D . If there exist ,y  Dyˆ with yy ˆ  such that  yfy  and   yyf ˆˆ  , then f  
has a minimal fixed point x .  Moreover, yx   and  yFx klim . That is, the 
minimal fixed point can be computed iteratively by means of the iteration scheme 
 yx 0  
  kk xfx 1   ,....2,1,0k  
Moreover, the sequence  kx  is increasing. 
Proof: Since f  is increasing, the hypotheses imply that f  maps the order interval 
 yy,  into itself.  Consequently, the sequence  kx  is well-defined and, since it is 
contained in  yyf , , it is relatively compact.  Hence it has at least one limit point.  By 
induction, it is easily seen that the sequence  kx  is increasing.  This implies that it has 
exactly one limit point x  and that the whole sequence converges to x . Since  is 
continuous, x  is a fixed point of f .  If x  is an arbitrary fixed point in D  such that 
yx  , then, by replacing y  by x  in the above argument, it follows that xx  . Hence 
x  is the minimal fixed point of f  in   DPy  .  It should be observed that we do 
not claim that there exists a minimal fixed point of f  in D . 
We can also show that if dNxXxF  :  is an intersecting compact map 
in a non-empty order interval   xx ˆ,  and Fxx   and xxF ˆˆ   then F  has a minimal 
fixed point *x  and a maximal fixed point **x .  Moreover,  xFx klim*   and 
 xFx k ˆlim**  . The first of the above sequences is increasing and the second is 
decreasing 
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